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The year 1754 saw the outbreak of a struggle in North America which is 
known to modern Americans as the French and Indian War; to its contem- 
poraries in America it was merely the French War. As official sanction by the 
great powers was not granted until 1756 and because the war dragged on until 
1763, Europeans call the conflict the Seven Years War. 
The American phase of the war erupted as a result of long standing Anglo- 
French-Indian rivalries and tensions. These came to a head in the French 
occupation of the Ohio Valley to prevent claims by American land speculators 
such as the Ohio Company. Virginian militia were sent to the disputed area 
under one George Washington, but were quickly humbled. The French, of 
course, blamed England for the hostilities: 
Royal Decree containing a Declaration of War Against England 
All Europe knows that in 1754 the King of England was the aggressor 
against the possessions of the King in North America and that in June of 
last year the English navy, regardless of international law and the sanctity 
of treaties, commenced the most violent hostilities against the vassals of 
His Majesty and against his subjects' shipping and trade.l 
Naturally, England considered France the guilty party. King George I1 stated: 
The injuries and hostilities which have been for some time committed by 
the French against my domains and subjects, are now followed by the 
1 Collection de Manuscrits contenant Lettres, Me'moires, et autres Documents 
Historiques relatifs a la Nouvelle-France, vol. IV (Quebec, 1885), p. 15. (All 
citations from French are translated by the author.) 
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actual invasion of the island of Minorca, which stands guaranteed to me 
by all the great powers in Europe, and in particular by the French king.2 
The war would end with the first British Empire at its height, New France 
would no longer threaten the Anglo-American colonies, and India would 
firmly become a British sphere of influence as a result of the battle of Plassey. 
Frederick the Great and Prussia were confirmed as great forces in Europe. 
Spain lost Florida, but gained New Orleans. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the struggle was as a harbinger of 
the policies, tactics, problems and misunderstandings that culminated and 
predominated in the course of the American Revolution, both militarily and 
politically. 
Unlike previous military enterprises in North America, which had largely 
been undertaken at the expense of the colonies and with colonial troops, the 
British government, apparently expecting war with France, sent regular 
soldiers. In an attempt to capture Fort Duquesne (presently Pittsburgh), a 
French stronghold on the Ohio, the commanding British general, Braddock, 
lost not only his force and his life, but also the respect Americans had held for 
the British army. This would seriously hamper operations throughout the war. 
Americans and Englishmen both underestimated and underplayed each other's 
role, and mutual resentment grew. 
An American myth promulgated since the 19th century by popular 
American historiographers and inculcated in public schools and textbooks is 
the belief that the French and Indian War and the American Revolution were 
fought and won by American riflemen, "embattled farmers", "minutemen", and 
other irregular troops in imitation of Indian tactics. This is usually coupled 
with the notion that the hardy colonial troops were vastly superior to, morally 
as well as militarily, or at least the equal of, the professional officers and men 
of the British armed forces. Such views can be found in the writings of George 
Bancroft in 1885, Woodrow Wilson in 1902, Carl Lotus Becker in 1943 and 
even to a certain degree as recently as Daniel J. Boorstin in 1958.~ This is far 
2 Parliamentary History, vol. XV (London, 1806-20), p. 771. 
3 George Bancroft, History of the United States of America, vol I1 (1885, 
reprinted Port Washington, New York, 1967), p. 454: "Provincials had saved 
the remnant of Braddock's army; provincials had conquered Acadia; provincials 
had defeated Dieskau: but Abercrombie and his chief sheltered their own 
imbecility under complaints of America." Woodrow Wilson, A History of the 
American People , vo1 I1 (New York and London, 1902), p. 124: "The 
provincial levies raised in the colonies had fought alongside the King's troops 
- in all the movements of the war, and had found themselves not a whit less able 
to stand and fight, not a whit less needed in victory. Braddock had died 
loathing the redcoats and wishing to see none but the blue cloth of the 
Virginian volunteers ... the provincials knew when the war was over that the 
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from the case. The use of "Indian" tactics on a scale large enough to win or 
lose a war, was impossible for a variety of reasons. Not the least of these were 
the limitations of 18th century weapons. As a Colonel George Hanger wrote: 
A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly illbored (as many of them are), will 
strike the figure of a man at 80 yards; it may even at 100; but a soldier 
must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common 
musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him; and as to firing 
at a man at 200 yards with a common musket, you may just as well fire 
at the moon and have the same hopes of hitting your object. I do maintain 
and will prove, whenever called on, that no man was ever killed at 200 
yards, by a common soldiers musket, by the person who aimed at him.4 
Though 18th century rifles were indeed more accurate than the standard "Brown 
Bess" muskets, they did have three great disadvantages; one had to stand up in 
order to load them, thus possibly exposing oneself to enemy fire, one could 
not affix a bayonet, and rifles took considerably more time to load and fire 
than the unrifled muskets. Riflemen were therefore usually employed on the 
flanks or as snipers. The formal conduct of warfare during the period, drawing 
up lines and columns of men at close distance, was not just a matter of sheer 
stupidity. Rather it was by necessity the only way to make best use of the 
musket and the only sure hope for inflicting casualties on the enemy. Though 
the individual musket might have been extraordinarily inaccurate, the fire- 
power ensuing from a whole regiment's barrage was murderous. Colorful 
uniforms not only bolstered morale, but were needed in order to recognize 
friend from foe in the thick acrid clouds of smoke that resulted from the use of 
black powder. American militia, contrary to popular belief, were trained and 
usually performed in the conventional manner of European warfare. At such 
they were grossly inefficient, according to an American captain, Peter Wraxall: 
redcoats were no better than they were." Carl Lotus Becker, Beginnings of the 
American People, (Boston and New York, 1943), p. 192: "Who were these men 
from overseas to instruct natives in the art of frontier warfare? -men who pro- 
claimed their ignorance of the woods by standing grouped and red-coated in the 
open to be shot down by Indians whom they did not see?" Daniel J. Boorstin, 
while praising the virtues of the American rifle, the frontier uprearing of the 
Americans and their expertise in warfare, does later admit that the same 
problems the British encountered in employing colonial troops were later to 
plague General Washington's army. The Americans. The Colonial Experience, 
(New York, 1958), pp. 350-351, 353. 
4 Colonel George Hanger, To All Sportsmen and Particularly to Farmers and 
Gamekeepers (London, 1814), p. 205. 
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The officers of this Army with very few exceptions are utter Strangers to 
Military Life and most of them in no Respect superior to the Men they 
are put over, they are like the Heads and indeed are the Heads of a Mob. 
The Men are raw Country Men. They are flattered with an easy and 
Speedy Conquest; All Arts are used to hide future Difficulties and Dangers 
from them, and the whole Undertaking in all its Circumstances smoothed 
over to their Imaginations.. . .5 
The famous Ranger bands led by Major Robert Rogers were specially selected 
for their attributes, which were found lacking in the majority of American 
troops. For example, Major General James Abercromby's orders to Rogers 
expressly stated that Rogers was to enlist no  vagrant^.^ Furthermore, many 
English soldiers served on attached duty with the ~ange r s?  
The use and contribution of guerilla bands has also been exaggerated. 
Aside from reconnaissance and protecting the flanks of the advancing armies, 
in bodies ranging from 1 man to over 400, their prime use was in raiding.8 A 
further duty placed upon the Rangers was that of informing various isolated 
French garrisons of the capitulation of New France in 1760 and to accept their 
s~rrender.~ 
It is worth noting that many of the officers who took part in the American 
Revolution received their training during the war. Major Rogers, for example, 
became a Lieutenant-Colonel and raised the Queen's Rangers from New York 
and Connecticut ~ o ~ a 1 i s t s . l ~  His colleague and captain, John Stark, like 
Rogers from New Hampshire, became colonel and commander of the 1st New 
Hampshire Regiment and the 5th Continental Regiment and served with 
distinction on the rebel side at ~enn ing t0n . l~  
5 Stanley M. Pargellis (ed.), Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1763 
(New York and London, 1936), p. 136. John Shy in A People Numerous and 
Armed, (London, Oxford and New York, 1976), pp. 30-33, points out that the 
colonial troops who had exhibited such poor discipline and low morale were 
not, in fact, militiamen, but rather draftees or the impoverished who either were 
enticed by promises of good pay or were forcibly impressed into military 
service. 
6 Robert Rogers, Journals (London, 1765), reprinted with an introduction by 
Howard H. Peckham (New York, 1961), p. 37. 
7 Ibid., pp. 41-43. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Ibid., pp. 142-171. 
10 John Molo, Uniforms of the American Revolution (New York, 1975), p. 
171. 
11 F.A. Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units (Harrisburg, 1972), 
p. 32 and p. 79. 
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A source of irritation between the Americans and regulars was the 
difference in pay. A Connecticut volunteer earned approximately 10d. per day. 
A British soldier earned 5d., and was forced to pay so-called "stoppages", that 
is, the cost of his uniform, musket and other accoutrements. Privates of 
Roger's Rangers were at first paid 3s. per day, but this was later reduced to 
2/6.12 
Officers also resented each other. General John Forbes called the American 
officers "...an extreme bad collection of broken innkeepers, horse jockeys, and 
Indian traders."13 
The French-Canadian army was beset by similar problems between 
Europeans and Canadian militia, and between the Canadian-born governor, 
Vaudreuil, and the Marquis de Montcalm. Canada, however, was far more 
dependent on the militia and Canadian-raised "Marine" than the British. At the 
most there were about 6,600 French regular troops serving in America, with 
only slim possibilities of resupply or of obtaining fresh troops from France 
due to England's formidable sea power. At Montreal in 1760, Major General 
Levis, the French military commander, had only 2,000 regulars and about 
1,000 militia against a combined Anglo-American army of 17,000. 
Much use was made by both armies of another source for irregular troops, 
that is, the Indians. It is interesting to note how the British placed a veneer of 
civilization on the tribes. In a letter to "King" Uncus of the Mohegans, 
Rogers uses the address "Brother Uncus", and requests his aid thusly: 
Should you choose to come out a Captain, General Amherst will readily 
give the commission for it; if not, I shall expect Poquipe and Nunnpiad. I 
leave you the choice of an Ensign and two Sergeants, but I hope you'll 
engage the fittest men for their stations. I would have the company 
consist of 500 private men or more if you can get them, ... You may 
employ a Clerk for the company, to whom General Amherst will allow 
the usual pay.14 
Dependence upon Indians could have several disadvantages. Following his 
defeat at Lake George, a prisoner of the English and seriously wounded, 
General Dieskau wrote to Vaudreuil to inform him of the treachery of the 
Iroquois that had ruined his chances for victory.15 
12 Rogers, op. cit., p.11 and p. 36. 
13 Forbes to Pitt, 6 September 1758, Correspondence of William Pitt, when ' 
secretary of state, vol. I (New York and London, 1906), p.342. 
14 Rogers, op, cit., pp. 91-92. 
15 Collection de Manuscrits, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Furthermore, the Indians tended not to understand the civilities and niceties 
of 18th century warfare, such as captured officers giving their "parole", that is, 
a promise not to participate in further hostilities in return for release. After the 
surrender of Fort William Henry, the Indians lost patience, as stated in an 
extract of a letter published in England, dated thel5th of August 1757. 
. . . when Montcalm called aside our field officers and said, the Indians 
always expected, and would have plunder; and for fear of bad consequences, 
advised them to give their packs to them, which they did tho' with 
reluctance. 
As soon as the Indians got them, they began to massacre all the sick and 
wounded within the lines and before both armies; next they hauled all the 
Negroes, Mullatoes and Indian soldiers out of the ranks, butchering and 
scalping them; when our men began to march, they then began without 
distinction, stript and tomahawked both officers and men, and all in the 
greatest confusion took to their heels; and thus those that came in made 
their escape. l6 
Another contemporary wrote: 
To what a pitch of perfidy and cruelty is the French nation arrived! Would 
not an ancient heathen shudder with horror on hearing so hideous a tale? 
It is the most Christian King that could give such orders? Or could the 
most nations ever excuse such French barbarity? Besides this was it ever 
known in the Pagan world, that terms of capitulation were held inviolably 
sacred.17 
Montcalm himself wrote letters to Lord Loudoun and General Webb 
explaining his conduct at William Henry and commending the defense put up 
by Colonel Monrow, the commander of the fort: 
I am grateful for having exposed myself as well as my officers [to danger] 
in defence of your [officers], who will testify to all that I did on this 
occasion. Tomorrow I will convey to you the prisoners whom I have 
gathered together and taken back from the hands of the Savages.. .18 
16 Ib id . ,  p. 119. 
17 Ib id . ,  p. 121. 
18 Ib id . ,  p. 114. 
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The French also made use of Irish deserters and formed them into a company 
with their own sergeants, corporals, musician and camp followers.1g 
By and large the French served quite well and dutifully throughout the 
campaign. Often they won victories at astonishing odds such as at 
Ticonderoga (Fort Carillon). Rogers placed the size of the British army at 
about 16,000 men. In summing up the results of the battle he merely states: 
Our loss both in the regular and provincial troops was somewhat 
considerable. The enemy's loss was about 500 besides those who were 
taken prisoner.20 
French accounts were somewhat more jubilant: 
Would one believe it, Sir, that 20,000 Englishmen were obliged to take 
flight before 3,250 Frenchmen; this is what happened to the troops of the 
King of England, commanded by major general Abercromby. The English 
were bent on taking Fort Carillon in order to make themselves masters of 
Canada, full of confidence in the superior number of their troops, this 
conquest appeared certain, but they had not reckoned with Monsieur 
Vaudreuil or with the Marquis de Montcalm. 21 
French losses were also rather reduced: "We have lost 12 officers and 92 
soldiers who remain on the battlefield. All together we had 25 wounded 
officers and 248 wounded soldiers."22 
The loss of New France cannot be blamed on the conduct of the French 
troops. Traditionally the date used for the fall of the colony is the 13th of 
September 1759. On that day General Wolfe defeated the Marquis de 
Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham outside of Quebec. Both commanders 
died during the action; Wolfe's final words were reportedly, "I thank God and 
die content." Montcalm supposedly said, "I die content, since I have the 
affairs of the King, my dear master, in good hands. I always had a very great 
consideration for the talent and capacity of Monsieur de ~ e v i s . " ~ ~  A few days 
later the city of Quebec surrendered. 
This was not the end of the war. If anything the fate of Canada had been 
sealed years before. The population of Canada was roughly 55,000, that of the 
American colonies about one and a quarter million. The English colonies were 
19 Ibid., pp. 97-99. 
20 Rogers, op. cit., p. 84. 
21 Collection de. Manuscrits, op. cit., p. 219. 
22 Ibid.,  p. 222. 
23 Ibid., p. 231. 
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wealthy and prosperous; Canada was merely a drain on the French crown. As 
Voltaire put it: 
. . . you know that these two nations are at war over some acres of snow in 
Canada, and that they spend much more on this wonderful war than all of 
Canada is worth..24 
Britain had 23,000 men serving, who were amply and easily supplied from 
America and Britain, while the Royal Navy insured little aid would reach 
Canada from France; yet the French fought tenaciously. In 1760 General Levis 
besieged the English in Quebec and defeated them at St. Foix just as Wolfe 
had done to the French, though the British fell back on Quebec and the siege 
c o n t i n ~ e d . ~ ~  Levis hopes rested on help from abroad. 
They wanted only the arrival of the ship from France with artillery and 
ammunition to crown Monsieur de Levis with the glory. The English in 
Quebec confessed that the first flag which would appear on the St. 
Lawrence river would decide the question if Canada should remain in 
possession of the English or return to French. 
No ship arriving from France with the artillery, the fate of Canada was at 
last fixed by the arrival of three [British] men of war the 7th of 
The French army then retreated to Montreal where eventually it and all of 
French Canada surrendered on the 8th of September 1 7 6 0 . ~ ~  
To the victor goes the spoils is the old adage. The attitude of the 
victorious British soldiers can be summed up in the following song, called 
"Hot Stuff ': 
Come, each death-doing dog who dares venture his neck, 
Come, follow the hero that goes to Quebec. 
Jump aboard of the transports and loose every sail, 
Pay your debts at the tavem by giving leg-bail.28 
24 Fran~ois-Marie de Voltaire, Candide ou l'optimisme (Amsterdam?, 1759), 
reprinted in Les avres completes de Voltaire, edition critique par RenC Pomeau, 
vol. 48 (Oxford, 1980), p. 223. 
25 Collection de Manuscrits, op. cit., pp. 251-252. 
26 Ibid., pp. 254-255. 
27 Ibid.,  p. 262. 
28 Leg-bail, to escape from custody. 
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And ye that loves fighting shall soon have enough, 
Wolfe commands us, my boys; we shall give them Hot Stuff. 
Up the river Saint Lawrence our troops shall advance, 
To the Grenadiers March we will teach them to dance. 
Cape Breton we've taken and next we will try 
At their capital to give them another black eye. 
Vaudreuil, 'tis in vain you pretend to look gruff, 
Those are coming who know how to give you Hot Stuff. 
With powder in his periwig and snuff in his nose, 
Monsieur will run down our descent to oppose. 
And the Indians will come, but the Light Infantry, 
Will soon oblige them to betake to a tree. 
From such rascals as these may we fear a rebuff? 
Advance Grenadiers and let fly your Hot Stuff. 
When the 47th Regiment is dashing ashore, 
While bullets are whistling and cannons do roar, 
Says Montcalm: 'Those are Shirley's--I know their lapels.'29 
'You lie,' says Ned Botwood, 'we belong to ~ a s c e l l e s . ~ ~  
Though our clothing is changed yet we scorn a powder-puff 
So at you, ye bastards, here's give you Hot Stuff.' 
With Monckton and Townshend, those brave  brigadier^,^ 
I think we shall soon have the town 'bout their ears. 
And when we have done with the mortars and guns, 
'If you please, Madame Abbess, a word with your nuns.' 
Each soldier shall enter the convent in buff, 
And then never fear we will give them Hot Stuff. 
29 "Those are Shirley's...", i.e., the colonials led by William Shirley, 
Governor of Massachusetts. To call a regular soldier a member of Shirley's 
command was a grave insult as they did not want to be thought of as mere 
provincial yokels, but as professional soldiers. Regiments in the British army 
were distinguished from one another, among other things, by the varying 
colours of the lapels on the uniform coats. This was employed with a system of 
multi-coloured regimental lace that was used as an edging to uniforms, for 
example, around button holes. In the case of the 47th Regiment the lapels were 
white. 
30 Ned Botwood, sergeant In the 47th. Lascelles, Lieutenant-General, 
commander of the 47th Regiment, Collection de Manuscrits, op. cit., p. 266. 
31 Monckton and Townshend, commanders of the 17th and 28th regiments 
respectively, 1oc.cit. 
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Royalty was somewhat more gallant: 
In the summer of 1763, Le Chevalier Chaussgros de Lery and his Lady 
were presented at court and where [sic] the first of the [new] subjects of 
George the 111 who had that honour. 
The young and gallant Monarch on receiving Madame de Lery, who was a 
very beautiful woman, observed to her: 
'If all the Ladies of Canada are as handsome as yourself, I have indeed 
made a conquest.'32 
With the benefit of hindsight we might judge King George's boast as being a 
bit premature. Though King George and his successors were to maintain 
control over Canada, the cost was far greater than those "few acres of snow" 
were worth for the conquest of Canada entailed the loss of the far wealthier and 
more important American colonies. 
When peace was declared in 1763 it was felt by many, including William 
Pitt, to be merely an "armed truce" in light of the French decision to station 
some 20,OO men in the West ~ n d i e s . ~ ~  Parliament decided to counter this 
move by deploying 10,000 regulars in North America to be paid for through 
direct taxation of the American colonies.34 At an average annual cost of 
£389,752 this amounted to nearly 4 percent of the national budget and was a 
true burden on the British tax-payer, who naturally enough, felt it only just 
that the Americans contribute economically to their own defence as well as to 
the debt incurred through the war.35 
With the removal of the French threat in Canada, the Americans could 
perceive no legitimate reason for the continued presence of a strong British 
32 Ibid., p. 313. 
33 Peter D. G. Thomas, "New Light on the Commons Debate of 1763 on the 
American Army", William and Mary Quarterly vol. XXXVIII no. 1 (1981), 110- 
12 .  
34 Loc. cit. 
35 Peter D.G. Thomas, "The Cost of the British Army in North America, 
1763-1775," William and Mary Quarterly vol. XLV no. 3 (1988), 516. Thomas 
notes on 512 that the nominal number of troops was gradually reduced from 
10,000 men (20 battalions each consisting of 500 men) to 6,201 (13 
battalions of 477 men) by 1773. The actual number of regulars would have been 
much lower as battalions were seldom up to strength. A muster in 1763 
revealed, for example, only 6,400 men at a time when there nominally ought to 
have been 10,000. 
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force and were especially adverse to the idea of actually paying for this 
military establishment or to the war debt by means of what they deemed to be 
attempts at unconstitutional taxation. The various crises between the 
American colonies and Britain soon ensued. To put it simply, without a 
French bogeyman the raison dle^tre for American subservience to Britain's 
interests vanished. 
The French and Indian War served as a training ground for countless 
American officers in the Revolution, who indeed were to attempt to emulate 
Britain's success by trying to conquer Canada themselves. But we must not 
forget that it also gave the British military valuable experience in conducting 
warfare under American conditions. The British did not perform so badly 
during the Revolution as the popular myths would have it, and were, when 
necessary, "...as adept at irregular warfare, at the tactics of hit and run as.. .the 
rebels."36 
The bad showing and poor quality of the American troops during the 
French and Indian conflict might have led British military and civil authorities 
to believe that it would be a simple matter to quell the Revolution militarily, 
while the Americans, having seen British fiascoes such as Braddock's defeat at 
Fort Duquesne or Abercromby's at Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) may have been 
misled into thinking that the British were more inept than they actually were, 
and that a war of independence would be an easier matter than it proved to be. 
Finally, the extremely disharmonious contacts and the countless insults 
exchanged between the British and Americans may have strengthened the 
American's view of his own identity as an American and not an Englishmen 
and weakened the sense of common bonds and purposes. 
36 Shy, op,  cit., pp. 9-13. 
